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Abstract 
In 2003 an agreement was finalized to instigate arguably the most significant reform of the European 
Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since its inception. In the Luxembourg Agreement many 
of the direct payments that have been linked to production are decoupled and instead provided in the form 
of a land-based payment. The reforms did not include any significant changes to either EU border support 
or the ability of the EU to utilize export subsidies that have been widely criticized by other nations. Even 
though the reforms do not directly address trade in agricultural products it is argued that World Trade 
Organization (WTO) concerns played a significant role in the designs of the reforms. In this paper an 
analysis of the Luxembourg reforms and the European proposal for agriculture under the WTO is 
presented. The results are used as the basis for a discussion of the interaction of the WTO and CAP reform 
and the implications for the agricultural sector in the EU. 
 
Key words: CAP reform, WTO, decoupling, policy analysis. 
 
The Luxembourg reform is the latest in a series of significant changes to the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) made over the last 12 years. The changes have been 
primarily motivated by budgetary concerns, in particular they have sought to address the 
problem of growing commodity surpluses that arose from open-ended price support. In 
1992 the MacSharry reforms transferred some of the support to agriculture from 
supporting prices to direct payments. In addition to internal EU budgetary pressures, the 
Uruguay GATT round also played a role in the shape of the final reform agreement. The 
imposition of export subsidy limits was expected to further hinder the ability of the EU to 
dispose of surpluses. The payments that were introduced as part of this reform were 
argued to be partially decoupled, providing the EU with some flexibility regarding 
restrictions on domestic support. 
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In Agenda 2000 the MacSharry policy reforms were deepened, with further cuts in 
intervention prices and increases in compensatory payments. In a move that surprised 
many, further significant reforms were proposed in 2002. There were many forces 
motivating these reforms: the ambitions of outgoing EU Commissioner Franz Fischler, 
the impending enlargement of the EU, and the Doha Round WTO negotiations. The EU1 
submitted its proposal on modalities in January 2003 (European Commission, 2003a), 
prior to the final agreement on CAP reform. Inevitably, links were made between the 
modalities proposal and the ongoing reform process, but the Commission denied that the 
modalities paper was inconsistent with the CAP agreed in Agenda 2000 (Agra Europe, 
2002). The proposal argued for the blue box to be retained, and if that were to be the 
outcome of the negotiations the EU’s compensation payments could have been retained 
in their Agenda 2000 form. 
 
Under the Luxembourg Agreement a single farm payment (SFP) is introduced. Most of 
the current EU direct payments become part of the SFP and are paid to those holding land 
with a payment entitlement. The result of these changes is a significant decoupling of 
payments from production, although there is still a strong link with farming due to the 
restrictions that accompany the payments. As part of the process of reaching an 
agreement, significant variation in implementation of the SFP across countries was 
allowed, but even if countries choose to implement the minimum degree of decoupling 
                                                 
1 The countries of the EU are referred to as the European Communities within the WTO, but here EU is 
used for all references to that group of countries. 
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the EU will be able to shift a large amount of WTO blue box payments into the green 
box.  
 
This paper presents the simulation results from a model of the EU-15’s agricultural sector 
under the CAP reforms and incorporating the EU modalities proposal.2 The EU 
modalities paper specifies figures for the reductions in tariffs, export subsidy 
expenditures and the AMS that facilitate their analysis, albeit under a number of 
simplifying assumptions. This paper also includes a discussion of the US-EU joint 
initiative paper (European Commission/Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2003), and the “Derbez Text” (World Trade Organization, 2003) floated at Cancún. The 
model used for this analysis is the FAPRI GOLD (grains, oilseeds, livestock and dairy) 
model of the EU-15. The model has been developed under the auspices of the FAPRI-
Ireland Project, a US and Irish research collaboration.3 
 
The baseline scenario presented contains the CAP pre-Luxembourg reform. Given the 
fact that under the new measures countries have a variety of options as to how to 
implement the SFP, it was decided to analyze two scenarios, both of which incorporate 
the EU’s WTO proposal but which make different assumptions regarding the 
implementation of the reforms. In the first scenario, called MAX, the maximum amount 
of decoupling is carried out with all 15 countries choosing to fully implement the SFP at 
the earliest opportunity. In the second scenario, called MIN, some payments are paid in 
                                                 
2 The results presented here are for the EU-15 and therefore do not incorporate the recent enlargement.  
3 See http://www.tnet.teagasc.ie/fapri/ for more details of FAPRI-Ireland, and to access its publications. 
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their current form throughout the projections and the SFP is introduced on the latest 
allowable date. 
 
The GOLD Model 
 
The EU GOLD model is a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector in 
the fashion of the suite of models that FAPRI has used for many years in the analysis of 
agricultural policy both for the US and globally (Hanrahan (2001)). The model is 
designed to incorporate all the important biological and economic relationships inherent 
to the sector as well as focus on the detailed representation of agricultural policy in the 
EU. For example, production of beef depends not only on the price of beef and inputs, 
but also on the number of dairy cows and the payments that are made to beef animals in 
the EU. 
 
The model includes the main commodities that are supported in the EU. A simplified 
representation of the model’s coverage is presented in Figure 1. The prices of cereals and 
oilseeds appear as input costs in the production of meats. Meat and dairy production 
determines the volume of cereals and oilseed products consumed as feed. The model used 
in this analysis is of the EU-15, and splits the EU into France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, and a rest-of-EU block. 
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Figure 1: Commodity coverage and linkages in the GOLD model. 
  
The data for the model comes mainly from EUROSTAT (New Cronos) and the USDA 
(P,S and D). The model is arranged as a system of single equations for the production, 
demand, and trade for each of the commodities. Most of the equations of the system have 
not been estimated, with the behavioral parameters taken from the literature or imposed 
on the basis of analyst judgment. The model is continuously updated on the basis of 
policy developments or in response to feedback from the variety of analyses that have 
been undertaken using it. 
 
The model solves for a lead price (usually the French price) to clear the market for each 
of the commodities. Trade for the EU is subject to the constraints of either the agreements 
made under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) or scenario 
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assumptions. In this analysis a reduced form of the FAPRI global system is used to 
simulate the response of the rest of the world to the changes in trade from the EU. 
 
The model focuses on the incorporation of policy instruments and their impact on the 
decision to produce. Direct payments are incorporated differently in the different sectors. 
Arable area aid payments under Agenda 2000 policy have been more decoupled than 
payments on animals, given that they are not crop specific and in many cases producers 
have the option to set aside land voluntarily. In this model the arable area aid payment 
plays more of a role in the determination of overall crop area than the share of land 
allocated to each crop. Payments that are made in the cattle and sheep sectors have been 
made on a per head basis so in the model those payments determine animal numbers 
directly. Since the milk quota determines output in the dairy sector throughout the 
projection period, the payments that are introduced are assumed to have no impact on 
production. 
 
Central to the scenario analysis is how the introduction of the SFP is modeled. If the SFP 
is truly fully decoupled, it should be incorporated in the model simply by setting payment 
rates to zero and including just the payments that are directly linked to production 
decisions. There are a number of reasons why the SFP should not be considered to be 
fully decoupled. Cross compliance criteria require farmers to “maintain land in good 
agricultural condition.” Even lump sum payments may influence the production decision 
depending on producers’ attitude to risk (Hennessey, 1998). Furthermore, production 
may be undertaken if there is a perception that there might be future policy changes that 
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again tie benefits to production (Josling, 2003). Therefore, in the model the SFP 
payments are assumed to be partially decoupled – one euro of SFP is assumed to have the 
same impact on production as 0.3 euro of coupled payments. 
 
The model uses exogenous macroeconomic data and price projections from the FAPRI 
global modeling system to generate a baseline, or current policy scenario. The baseline is 
then used as a benchmark against which to compare policy simulations. It is important to 
remember that the baseline does not constitute a forecast but a projection under a certain 
set of assumptions. In this analysis the GOLD baseline generated in spring 2003 was 
used. While there have been changes in currency and commodity markets in the interim, 
we feel that the overall results of our analysis in terms of the impact of the Luxembourg 
reform and the WTO modalities proposal and the conclusions drawn from it remain 
robust. 
 
The Impact of CAP Reform  
 
When the Mid-Term Review (MTR) was published in 2002 (European Commission, 
2002) it proposed that most of the direct payments should be converted to a single 
payment linked to land and not to the production of a single commodity. The proposal 
faced much resistance from countries that argued it was too soon to instigate such 
changes (e.g., Ireland) or those opposed to the contents of the reform package (e.g., 
France and Spain) for fear of the impact on their agricultural sectors. Nonetheless, the 
proposed legislation that emerged, referred to as the “Long-Term Perspective” (LTP) 
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document (European Commission, 2003b), kept the proposal largely intact. The GOLD 
model was used to analyze both the MTR and the LTP in Binfield and Westhoff (2003) 
and Binfield et al. (2003) respectively. 
 
Given the widespread resistance to the changes it was inevitable that the final agreement 
would result in a political compromise. The final agreement (Council of the European 
Union, 2003) allowed the “re-coupling” of some of the payments through a variety of 
options. Either 25 percent of the arable area aid payment or 40 percent of the durum 
wheat payment can be paid in its existing form. Some livestock payments can be 
maintained at their present level. In addition, the SFP entitlement can be calculated on a 
historic basis, or allocated regionally, or a combination of both. The combination of the 
re-coupling options and the ability to determine the payment in a number of ways 
complicates analysis, and constitutes a significant renationalisation of agricultural policy 
in the EU. 
 
The Scenarios Analyzed 
 
Given the complexity of the choices that could be made under the reforms, and the fact 
that at the time of the analysis many countries had not submitted their intentions 
regarding SFP implementation, it was decided to run two scenarios. In the MAX 
scenario, we assume that the SFP is introduced at the earliest possible date, and the 
maximum amount of payments are transferred into the SFP. Under this scenario, 
therefore, the payments are the most decoupled from production. Under the MIN 
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scenario, the SFP is introduced at the latest possible date, and countries avail of all of the 
re-coupling options available to them. In the baseline, the Agenda 2000 CAP is 
maintained for the projection period.4 
 
In both the MAX and MIN scenarios the other changes that were made to the CAP are 
incorporated. Intervention is abolished for rye and the intervention price for rice is 
halved. The 15 percent intervention price reduction for butter scheduled under Agenda 
2000 is increased to 25 percent and is brought forward, along with the skimmed milk 
powder (SMP) intervention price reductions. Dairy quota increases planned under 
Agenda 2000 are delayed by a year. 
 
In both scenarios, an attempt is made to incorporate the proposals regarding the WTO 
made in the EU submission on modalities. The choice of implementation in the model is 
complicated by the fact that the EU modalities proposal only suggests average rates of 
reduction for export subsidies and tariffs. In the scenarios these are applied uniformly 
across commodities, although the experience of the implementation of the URAA would 
suggest that in practice sensitive commodities would only be subject to the minimum 
reduction required. Under a more flexible interpretation of the modalities proposal the 
impact on EU agriculture could be even smaller than that outlined here. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that all countries opt for the historical approach to calculation of 
the SFP. This assumption should have little impact on the results in most cases. 
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Results of scenarios  
 
The impact of the CAP reform varies across different sectors, in part reflecting 
differences in the degree to which pre-reform payments were tied to production 
decisions. In the crop sector the arable area aid payment was relatively decoupled, so the 
introduction of the SFP has relatively little effect (Table 1). For most of the crops there is 
a reduction in area of less than 2 percent for the EU and the resulting fall in output has a 
small positive impact on world prices. 
 
Table 1: Crop sector baseline and scenario impacts (2007-2012 average). 
 
  Baseline MAX MIN 
EU-15 crop area (1000 ha.) Actual and percentage change from baseline 
   Soft Wheat 14,282 -89 -0.6% -63 -0.4% 
   Durum 3,798 -185 -4.9% -165 -4.3% 
   Barley 10,750 -47 -0.4% -45 -0.4% 
   Corn 4,371 -12 -0.3% -12 -0.3% 
   Rye 960 -84 -8.8% -84 -8.8% 
   Rice 391 -10 -2.6% -6 -1.5% 
   3 Oilseeds 4,984 -30 -0.6% -9 -0.2% 
   Total 39,537 -458 -1.2% -385 -1.0% 
      
World Prices ($/mt)      
   Wheat 146.67 0.98 0.7% 0.75 0.5% 
   Corn 104.73 0.33 0.3% 0.22 0.2% 
   Soybeans 232.39 0.62 0.3% 0.17 0.1% 
      
 
For some commodities there were additional reforms to the transfer of payments to the 
SFP. The payments made to durum wheat are reduced so there is a larger fall in durum 
area planted than the other major cereals. The end of intervention purchases of rye allows 
the price of that commodity to fall with the subsequent impact on area. Similarly, the 
halving of rice intervention prices means that rice area falls, although the fact that much 
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of the compensation for this fall is still fully coupled means that rice area does not fall to 
the same extent as rye area. 
 
The payments that have been made in the livestock sector are generally more coupled 
than for crops. In order to claim the suckler cow premia, special beef premia, slaughter 
premia, or ewe premia farmers had to own the appropriate animal. These payments were 
also relatively more important in the livestock sector, often contributing more than 100 
percent of some farmers’ net producer incomes in countries like the UK and Ireland. The 
decoupling of these payments therefore has a large impact on production (Table 2). Were 
none of the recoupling options to be pursued, beef cow numbers are projected to fall by 
nearly 11 percent under the MAX scenario, resulting in a reduction of beef production of 
2.6 percent. In the sheep sector, given the absence of exports and tight control on imports, 
prices rise by more than the beef sector and so the reduction in sheep numbers is not so 
dramatic. 
 
In the dairy sector, production is determined by the quota and there is little difference in 
the volume of milk produced. The larger fall in the intervention price of butter leads to a 
reduction in butter production and stimulates production of cheese. Lower prices for  
products (with the exception of SMP) stimulate domestic consumption and lower net 
exports. 
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Table 2: Livestock sector baseline and scenario impacts (2007-2012 average). 
 
  Baseline MAX MIN 
EU-15 animal numbers (1000 hd.) Actual and percentage change from baseline 
   Beef cows 11,816 -1,264 -10.7% -384 -3.2% 
   Ewes 65,432 -4,160 -6.4% -2,256 -3.4% 
      
EU-15 meat production  (1000 mt)     
   Beef 7,268 -189 -2.6% -15 -0.2% 
   Sheep meat 1,091 -60 -5.5% -19 -1.7% 
      
EU-15 meat prices  (euro/mt)     
   Beef 240.36 14.24 5.9% 1.50 0.6% 
   Pork 132.56 0.84 0.6% 0.13 0.1% 
   Poultry 126.91 0.92 0.7% 0.14 0.1% 
   Sheep meat 367.88 47.51 12.9% 13.35 3.6% 
      
EU-15 Dairy      
   Milk production (mmt) 122.36 -0.12 -0.1% -0.12 -0.1% 
   4 product net exports (mmt) 0.98 -0.12 -12.6% -0.12 -12.6% 
   Milk price (euro/100kg) 27.2 -0.80 -3.0% -0.81 -3.0% 
            
 
The WTO and EU Agriculture 
 
Projecting the expenditures under the various components that comprise the WTO 
commitments is complicated by the fact that at time of writing the EU has not reported 
domestic support to the WTO for any year after 1999 and there is no record of how the 
Agenda 2000 changes are to be incorporated. Expenditure estimates are based on the 
assumption that WTO notifications will be made in a similar way in the future as they 
have in the past. Projections are made using the figures that are produced by the model. 
 
In 1999 the EU reported domestic support under the amber box of 48 billion euro (against 
a limit of 69 billion) and 20 billion euro in blue box payments.  For 2000 and beyond, the 
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amber box limit is 67 billion euro. Since 1999, the CAP has reduced intervention prices 
further and increased direct payments, transferring more support from the amber to the 
blue box. The EU considers the SFP to be decoupled and that therefore expenditures 
under that measure would fall into the green box (European Commission, 2003c). 
 
The projections for EU-15 domestic support levels are presented in Table 3. The 
introduction of the SFP results in a large shift from the blue box to the green box. In the 
MIN scenario, blue box spending is reduced to 7 billion euro annually by 2007, while in 
the MAX scenario the blue box stands at less than 400 million euro annually after 2007. 
The differences between MAX and MIN reflect the options that are available to the 
individual countries and the different dates that are available for the introduction of the 
SFP. The CAP reforms also have an impact on the amber box regardless of the options 
chosen by member states through the reduction of the intervention price of butter and rice 
and the elimination of intervention for rye. 
 
The results suggest that meeting the requirements regarding domestic support in the 
original EU modalities proposal would not be a problem for the EU. Even under the 
baseline scenario the amber box support is well below the current limit. The introduction 
of the SFP results in much lower blue box expenditure, and even under the MIN scenario 
the value of the blue box expenditure is likely to be below the 5 percent level of 
production suggested in the EU-US joint proposal and the Derbez text (the details of the 
different proposals are summarized in the appendix to this paper). 
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Table 3: EU-15 domestic support levels. 
   2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
    million euro    
Permitted AMS 67,170 67,170 67,170      
         
Current AMS         
    Baseline 40,081 34,814 34,687   34,744   34,332  33,933    33,505    33,520 
    MAX   34,687 34,134 32,972 32,388 32,117 32,121 
    MIN   34,687 34,134 33,059 32,540 32,174 32,208 
         
Blue box         
   Baseline 23,064 24,018 23,989   23,998   25,020   26,029    27,054    27,033 
   MAX   23,989 25,330 367 372 376 379 
   MIN   23,989 25,330 26,976 28,366 7,411 7,089 
         
Sum of current AMS and blue box       
   Baseline 63,145 58,832 58,676 58,742 59,352 59,962 60,559 60,553 
   MAX   58,676 59,464 33,339 32,760 32,493 32,500 
   MIN   58,676 59,464 60,035 60,906 39,585 39,297 
         
Current AMS vs.2003/04 permitted AMS       
   Baseline   -48% -48% -49% -49% -50% -50% 
   MAX   -48% -49% -51% -52% -52% -52% 
   MIN   -48% -49% -51% -52% -52% -52% 
         
Sum of current AMS and blue box vs. 2003/04 sum 
of current AMS and blue box 
     
   Baseline   0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 
   MAX   0% 1% -43% -44% -45% -45% 
   MIN   0% 1% 2% 4% -33% -33% 
         
 
Source: FAPRI calculations based on GOLD model projections. 
  
Both the joint paper and the Derbez text call for reductions in the total of de minimis, 
blue box, and AMS. The EU has not utilized the de minimis provisions. In the baseline, 
under Agenda 2000 the reduction in the level of price support is offset by an increase in 
direct payments leaving the total largely unchanged. Table 3 shows that the sum of blue 
box and AMS is projected to fall significantly with the total falling by a third of the 
2003/04 sum by the end of the projection period in the MIN scenario. 
 
16 
The main impact of CAP reform on the EU’s position with regard to the WTO is in the 
classification of domestic support expenditure. The reform will have smaller impacts on 
both market access and export subsidies. The use of export subsidies by the EU as a 
method for the disposal of surplus production is perhaps the area under most pressure in 
the WTO negotiations, and it is realistic to assume that in any final Doha WTO 
agreement the export subsidy limits will at least be reduced significantly.  
 
In the EU beef sector, recent years have seen a dramatic reduction in the volume of beef 
exported as production has fallen and consumption rebounded post the latest BSE related 
shock. As a result, export subsidies are already well below the maximum level allowed 
both in volume and value terms. The reforms are likely to further reduce the volume and 
value of subsidized exports as beef production falls as the beef cow herd contracts, with 
the possibility that internal beef prices rise. The EU Commission may cut back on export 
subsidies if there is significant positive pressure on prices, as producers were 
compensated for a price fall that has yet to materialize under Agenda 2000. The 
projections here suggest that the EU could agree to even greater reductions in beef export 
subsidies than implied in the EU modalities submission without making further policy 
adjustments. 
  
In the cereal sector, successive reforms have seen EU prices converge with prices 
elsewhere in the world. In recent years some EU wheat exports have been undertaken 
without the use of subsidies. The Luxembourg reforms will have little impact on this 
situation, given the small changes that are projected above. There may be events in the 
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future that require large scale subsidization of exports but the probability of this 
occurring is low. 
 
For some dairy products, however, subsidized exports have been close to their URAA 
limits in recent years. The impact of CAP reform is to further reduce EU dairy product 
prices below those that were projected to occur in the baseline for all products except 
SMP. Lower internal prices mean that there is less surplus to export so the reforms reduce 
the volume and value of subsidized exports. Nonetheless, under the scenario, the strong 
projected euro/US dollar exchange rate and weakness in global dairy markets mean that 
the modalities scenario requires reductions in SMP and cheese, although the negative 
impact on prices is not substantial. 
 
Both the joint US and EU paper and the Derbez text include the objective of the 
elimination of export refunds of “particular interest to developing countries.” Such an 
agreement would mean that the EU could continue to support its more sensitive 
commodities. Throughout the Doha process the European Commission has been at odds 
with some member states as to the extent of reduction in subsidies that should be 
promised. In May 2004 the Commission offered to eliminate all export subsidies, albeit 
subject to its other demands on agriculture being met including the elimination of export 
credits and state trading enterprises (European Commission, 2004).   Phasing out export 
subsidies, also a feature of the Derbez text, would have a significant impact on EU 
agriculture and the results here suggest that some further reform of the CAP would be 
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needed, particularly in the dairy sector, to accommodate such an agricultural trade reform 
outcome from the Doha round.  
 
The reforms have even less impact on market access than on export subsidies. The only 
commodity where a change to market access is implemented is rice where the reduction 
in the intervention price requires a change in the access arrangements. The motivation for 
the reform of the rice sector arises from the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement 
extending duty free access to many developing countries. Reducing the intervention price 
would automatically reduce tariffs for those countries not part of the EBA agreement, but 
the Commission chose to restructure the way these tariffs were calculated. The degree of 
import access increase under the reforms is therefore restricted. 
 
In the scenario all tariffs were reduced by 30 percent. The fact that there is significant 
“water” in tariff levels currently means that this reduction has little effect on trade. For 
dairy products and beef, tariff levels are frequently over 100 percent of the world price. 
There are some increases in imports for some commodities. In beef, for example, 
although most traded cuts of beef are protected by substantial tariffs, there would be 
opportunities for more imports of some high quality cuts of meat or frozen beef. Since the 
model does not disaggregate commodities it is impossible to gauge the scale of such 
changes. Given the overall high level of tariffs, the projected small impact on imports 
seems defensible. 
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Under the EU modalities proposal it is reasonable to assume that changes to tariffs could 
be structured to minimize the impacts on markets. The joint initiative’s proposal for 
blended set of rules for tariff reductions is echoed in the Derbez text, but neither goes into 
enough details to draw conclusions regarding the level of market access. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2003 reform of the CAP constitutes a major change in the way direct payments are 
made in the EU. The introduction of the SFP results in a reduction in the link between the 
payments and production. The EU argues that the payments do not distort trade and 
therefore should be placed in the green box. The major impact of CAP reform on the EU 
negotiating position in the current round of the WTO negotiations is through the transfer 
of support from the blue box to the green box. 
 
The estimates in this paper, based on the simulation of a commodity-level partial 
equilibrium model, indicate that even if countries were to opt for the fullest possible 
degree of re-coupling, the EU would still be able to agree to reductions in domestic 
support outlined in their submission on modalities, or in the joint US-EU proposal with 
little or no further reform of the CAP. Recent changes in the tobacco, cotton, and olive oil 
sectors will further transfer expenditure out of the amber and blue boxes into the green 
box. 
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The reforms are likely to have less of an impact on export subsidy levels or market 
access. The changes for the crop sector, where the payments were previously relatively 
decoupled, are small. In the beef sector under a no policy change scenario, volume and 
value of export subsidies are well below their limits, with the reform likely to further 
decrease surplus as beef cow numbers drop. As the dairy quota stays in place the reforms 
will have little impact on the export subsidy situation in the dairy sector, where the  
current limits appear to be the most likely to be binding. The EU therefore remains 
vulnerable to changes in export subsidy limits in the dairy sector. 
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Appendix. Summary table of the proposals for the WTO discussed in the paper. 
 EU Modalities Papera Joint EU-US Initiativeb Derbez Textc 
    
Export Subsidies Average cut of 45% in 
value. 
Elimination of those of 
“particular interest to 
developing countries”, 
with unspecified 
reductions in value and 
quantity allowances for 
others 
Elimination of those of 
“particular interest to 
developing countries”, 
with unspecified 
reductions, “with a view 
to phasing out”, 
allowances for others 
    
Market Access 
  Tariff 
 
 
 
 
TRQs 
 
Average reduction of 
36% and minimum 
reduction of 15% 
 
 
No proposal for change 
 
Blended formula of fixed 
reductions, Swiss 
formula, and elimination 
of tariffs 
 
No specific proposal 
 
Blended formula of fixed 
reductions, Swiss 
formula, and elimination 
of tariffs 
 
Unspecified reduction 
    
Domestic Support 
   AMS 
    
   Blue box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   De minimis 
 
55% cut 
 
Retained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eliminated for 
developed countries 
 
Unspecified reduction 
 
Shall not exceed 5% of 
total value of agricultural 
production 
 
Sum of blue box and de 
minimis reduced 
significantly less than 
sum of de minimis, blue 
box, and AMS, in 2004 
 
Unspecified reduction 
 
Unspecified reduction 
 
Shall not exceed 5% of 
total value of agricultural 
production, with further 
reductions 
 
Sum of Total AMS, blue 
box, and de minimis cut 
on first year and then 
further phased reductions 
 
Unspecified reduction 
    
Phase in period 6 years for developed 
10 years for developing 
Not specified Not specified 
    
aEuropean Commission, 2003a. 
bEuropean Commission/Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2003. 
cWorld Trade Organization, 2003.  
 
